Ransomware gets the headlines because it is loud: screens go dark and operations stop. Business email compromise is quiet. Nothing breaks. An accounts executive pays an invoice that looks exactly like last month's, to a supplier they have paid twenty times, after an email thread that reads perfectly normally. The money simply goes to the wrong account, and nobody notices until the real supplier asks why they have not been paid.
The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center recorded close to $2.8 billion in BEC losses reported in 2024, and nearly $8.5 billion between 2022 and 2024 (Nacha, summarising the IC3 report). Those are only reported US complaints. Indian exporters, importers and manufacturers that pay foreign suppliers by wire transfer are squarely in the target group.
A business email compromise example, step by step
Here is a composite of how a typical BEC case unfolds. Names are illustrative.
- The mailbox is taken. A sales manager at a supplier in another country, or someone in your own purchase team, enters their password on a fake login page. The attacker now reads their email silently.
- The attacker waits. They read weeks of threads to learn who approves payments, the usual invoice format, the tone people write in and when large payments fall due.
- Rules hide the attacker. A mailbox rule moves any reply containing words like "bank" or "payment" into a hidden folder, so the real owner does not see the conversation.
- The switch. Just before a large payment, a message arrives in the existing thread: "Please note our bank account has changed due to an audit. Kindly use the attached updated details for this and future payments." Sometimes it comes from a look-alike domain, one letter different.
- Pressure. A follow-up says the shipment cannot leave until payment is received.
- Payment. Finance updates the vendor master and pays. The money moves on within hours.
Variants include the "CEO fraud", where a message that appears to come from the managing director asks accounts to make an urgent confidential transfer, and payroll diversion, where an "employee" asks HR to change their salary account.
Does this really happen to large, careful companies?
Yes. The best-known case involved two of the most technically sophisticated companies in the world. Between 2013 and 2015, a Lithuanian man posed as Quanta, a Taiwanese manufacturer that genuinely supplied servers and components to Facebook and Google. Using spoofed domains and fraudulent invoices, he got employees to wire money to accounts he controlled, netting about $99 million from Facebook and $23 million from Google. He pleaded guilty in March 2019 and was sentenced to 60 months in US federal prison (CyberScoop).
The lesson for an Indian founder is uncomfortable but useful: BEC succeeds against process gaps, not against unintelligent people. If those companies could be fooled by a familiar vendor name and a believable invoice, so can a 40-person company in Pune or Ludhiana.
Who inside an Indian company gets targeted?
Attackers go where money moves with the least friction. That usually means accounts payable staff who handle foreign remittances, purchase teams who deal with many vendors over email, the personal assistants of promoters and directors, and HR or payroll teams who can change salary accounts. Exporters are also targeted from the other side: a buyer abroad receives a fake "updated bank details" email that appears to come from the Indian exporter, pays the fraudster, and then the dispute lands on the exporter. Brief all of these people together, because the attack often crosses teams.
Why doesn't antivirus or the email filter catch it?
- There is often no malware and no malicious link in the final message, just text and a PDF.
- When the real mailbox is compromised, the email genuinely comes from the supplier's domain and passes authentication checks.
- Look-alike domains are newly registered and clean, so they have no bad reputation yet.
That is why the strongest defence is a finance process, backed by a few technical controls.
Payment-verification controls you can adopt this week
1. Call back before any bank detail change
Any request to change a vendor's bank account, by email, letter or WhatsApp, is verified by phone using a number already in your vendor master or on the original contract, never a number from the request itself. Record who called whom and when.
2. Two people for vendor master changes
The person who requests a bank detail change cannot be the person who approves it. Most accounting and ERP software supports this; switch it on.
3. A cooling-off period
New or changed beneficiary details are not used for payment for a fixed period, for example 48 hours, during which the vendor is contacted independently.
4. Thresholds for urgent requests
Above a set amount, urgent or confidential payment requests from senior management need verbal confirmation from that person. Put it in writing that no director will ever be upset at being asked.
5. A first small payment
For a new beneficiary, send a small test amount and have the vendor confirm the exact figure received through a known contact before sending the balance.
| Red flag in the email | What to do |
|---|---|
| "Our bank account has changed" | Stop. Call back on the known number. |
| Pressure: shipment held, penalty, deadline today | Slow down. Urgency is the attacker's tool. |
| Request to keep it confidential | Tell your manager anyway. |
| Domain slightly different from usual | Compare letter by letter with an old email. |
| Beneficiary name differs from the vendor's legal name | Do not pay until explained by phone. |
| Account in a country unrelated to the vendor | Treat as fraud until proven otherwise. |
Technical controls that support the process
- MFA on every mailbox, especially finance, purchase, sales and leadership.
- Alerts on new mailbox forwarding and inbox rules. Hidden rules are a classic BEC footprint.
- Sign-in monitoring for logins from unusual countries or impossible travel. A managed SOC watches for exactly these signals around the clock.
- DMARC on your own domain, moved to an enforcing policy, so attackers cannot easily send email that appears to come from you.
- External email banners, so a message from "your MD" that arrives from outside is visibly marked.
What to do if you have paid a fraudster
- Call your bank immediately and ask them to recall the transfer and contact the receiving bank. Hours matter.
- Report to the national cyber fraud helpline 1930 and on cybercrime.gov.in, and file a police complaint.
- Secure the compromised mailbox: reset the password, revoke sessions, remove rules and forwarding.
- Find out whose mailbox was compromised: yours or the vendor's. Tell the vendor either way.
- Preserve emails with full headers as evidence. Do not delete the thread.
- If personal data was accessed, consider your reporting duties to CERT-In and under the DPDP framework.
How Cehpoint can help
Cehpoint's Managed SOC and MDR service monitors mailbox sign-ins, rule changes and suspicious activity so compromised accounts are caught before the invoice switch. When fraud has already happened, our cyber-crime investigation and digital forensics team traces how the mailbox was accessed and preserves evidence for police and insurers. A short consultation is a sensible way to review your payment approval process.