Cloud providers secure the data centre, the hardware and the underlying platform. What you put on top, and who you let in, is your responsibility. This is the shared responsibility model, and it is where many cloud incidents happen. A developer makes a storage bucket public to share a file with a client "just for today", a test database is opened to the internet for a demo, an access key is pasted into a script and pushed to GitHub. Months later, someone else finds it.
This guide covers the small set of misconfigurations behind many cloud leaks, two well-documented real examples, and a self-audit checklist you can run on AWS, Azure or Google Cloud.
What are the most common cloud misconfigurations?
1. Storage that is public, or shareable by anyone with a link
Object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Blob Storage and Google Cloud Storage can be made readable by anyone on the internet. Sometimes the bucket itself is public; sometimes a long-lived shared link or token grants broad access. Invoices, KYC documents, database backups and log files are the usual contents.
2. Databases and admin panels reachable from the internet
Elasticsearch, MongoDB, Redis, MySQL and admin dashboards exposed on a public IP, sometimes with default or no authentication. Automated internet-wide scanners look for exactly these services all the time.
3. Over-broad identity and access permissions
A server role or service account given administrator rights "to make it work", or developers using the root account daily. When one server is compromised, the attacker inherits every permission it has.
4. Exposed access keys and secrets
Cloud keys, database passwords and API tokens inside source code, Docker images, mobile app packages or public repositories. Once leaked, a key works from anywhere until it is revoked.
5. Missing logging and alerting
Not a leak by itself, but the reason leaks go unnoticed. If audit logging is off or nobody reviews it, you learn about the problem from a journalist or a customer.
Two real cloud misconfiguration examples
Capital One, 2019: a cloud migration without enough risk assessment
In July 2019 Capital One disclosed that a hacker had obtained personal information of about 100 million people in the United States and 6 million in Canada (Insurance Journal). The US banking regulator, the OCC, later assessed an $80 million civil money penalty, citing the bank's failure to establish effective risk assessment processes before migrating significant IT operations to the public cloud, and its failure to correct the deficiencies in a timely manner (OCC news release).
The founder's lesson: the regulator's criticism was about process, not a single setting. Moving to the cloud is a change in your risk, and it needs a written assessment of who can reach what, before the move.
Microsoft AI researchers, 2023: one over-permissive token
Wiz Research found that a Microsoft AI research GitHub repository included an Azure storage access (SAS) token in its instructions. The token was scoped to the entire storage account with full control, not just read access, and exposed 38TB of private data, including backups of two employees' workstations with secrets and more than 30,000 internal Teams messages. The token had been committed in July 2020 and its expiry was later extended to 2051. Microsoft revoked it within two days of Wiz's report in June 2023 (Wiz Research).
The founder's lesson: a "share link" is a credential. Scope it to the smallest set of files, make it read-only and give it a short expiry. Because the token allowed writes, attackers could also have tampered with stored files, which turns a leak into a possible supply chain risk.
Cloud misconfiguration self-audit checklist
Run this monthly, and after any major release. It takes an experienced engineer a day or two for a typical startup account.
| Area | Check | AWS | Azure | GCP |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Storage | No public buckets or containers unless intended and documented | S3 Block Public Access at account level | Disable anonymous blob access on storage accounts | Enforce public access prevention |
| Shared links | Tokens scoped, read-only, short expiry | Pre-signed URL expiry | SAS tokens, prefer user-delegation SAS | Signed URL expiry |
| Network | No databases or admin ports open to 0.0.0.0/0 | Security groups | Network security groups | VPC firewall rules |
| Identity | No daily root or owner use; MFA on all humans | Root MFA, IAM Identity Center | Entra ID MFA, Conditional Access | Organisation policies, 2-step verification |
| Least privilege | No wildcard admin roles on workloads | IAM Access Analyzer | Role assignments review | IAM Recommender |
| Secrets | No keys in code or images; use a secrets manager | Secrets Manager | Key Vault | Secret Manager |
| Logging | Audit logs on, retained, and alerting set up | CloudTrail, GuardDuty | Activity logs, Defender for Cloud | Cloud Audit Logs, Security Command Center |
| Encryption | Encryption at rest and in transit enabled | KMS defaults | Storage service encryption | Default encryption, CMEK if needed |
Secrets hygiene in five rules
- Turn on secret scanning in your code repositories and block pushes that contain keys.
- Prefer short-lived credentials and workload identities over long-lived access keys.
- Rotate any key that has ever appeared in a commit, even if you deleted the commit.
- Never bake secrets into mobile apps or front-end code; anything shipped to a device is public.
- Keep an inventory: which keys exist, who owns them, when they expire.
Why this matters more in India now
The CERT-In Directions list "attacks or malicious/suspicious activities affecting Cloud computing systems/servers/software/applications", as well as data breaches and data leaks, among incidents to be reported within 6 hours, and require logs of ICT systems to be kept for 180 days within India (CERT-In Directions, 2022). The DPDP Rules, 2025 also name encryption, access control, logging and monitoring among the minimum "reasonable security safeguards" a data fiduciary must take, including for processing done by a cloud processor on its behalf (DPDP Rules, 2025). An open bucket full of customer KYC documents is now a regulatory problem as well as an embarrassing one.
Should you use a cloud security tool or do it by hand?
All three major clouds include free or low-cost posture tools that flag many of the issues above. Turn them on. They are good at finding settings; they are poor at judging context, such as whether a public bucket is your marketing site or your customer exports. A sensible pattern is tooling for continuous detection, plus a periodic human review of architecture and IAM, plus a penetration test of what is exposed to the internet.
How Cehpoint can help
Cehpoint's cloud and DevOps team reviews and hardens AWS, Azure and GCP accounts: storage exposure, network rules, IAM, secrets management and logging, set up as code so the fixes stay fixed. To see your environment the way an attacker would, combine it with VAPT of your internet-facing systems. If cloud costs are also a worry, our cloud cost optimisation work often finds forgotten, exposed resources at the same time.